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In its 2015 Final Report on “Measuring and Monitoring BEPS, Action 11”, the OECD 
introduced six indicators to quantify and evaluate base erosion and profit shifting (BEPS) 
activity over time. In this study, we revisit three selected indicators, provide a numerical update 
for recent periods using timely data and point out potential pitfalls when interpreting the 
indicator results. First, we transparently replicate Indicator 1, which intends to assess the 
disconnect between financial and real economic activities, and show a moderately decreasing 
trend of the indicator estimates. Second, replicating Indicator 4, which is based on a micro-data 
regression approach, we find that multinational firms have, on average, lower effective tax rates 
than domestic firms. We confirm this result using a state-of-the-art propensity score matching 
approach. Third, the replication of Indicator 5, which intends to capture profit shifting through 
intangibles, shows a stable trend of the annual indicator estimates that extends beyond the 
OECD’s sample period. Yet, the simplistic design of all indicators comes at the price of making 
them vulnerable to a number of confounding factors and economic effects that go beyond profit 
shifting. Overall, we conclude that the proposed indicators in the Final Report on BEPS Action 
11 provide only limited information on the extent of BEPS.  
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1. Introduction  
“The use of any indicators to identify the scale and economic impact of BEPS can only 
provide ‘general indications’ and the interpretation of any such indicators must be heavily 
qualified by numerous caveats.” 
(OECD, 2015, p. 41) 
Profit shifting of multinational corporations is a pressing topic in the public debate, academic 
research and on the political agenda. The debate on legal tax avoidance is fueled by anecdotal 
evidence on extremely low effective tax rates (ETRs) by multinational enterprises (MNEs). 
Especially, US companies with valuable intellectual property (IP), such as Google, Apple, and 
Amazon, are in the public focus for being tax ‘aggressive’.1 
The issue of ‘aggressive’ tax planning and cross-border income relocation is, of course, 
not new to policymakers. The release of the well-known Action Plan on Base Erosion and Profit 
Shifting (BEPS) by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) in 
2013 has lifted the issue to one of the top priorities in international politics. Since then, many 
nations have implemented far-reaching reforms to prevent ‘aggressive’ income shifting, to 
strengthen anti-tax avoidance legislation and to conserve corporate tax revenues. While some 
reforms are part of coordinated supranational actions, e.g., the EU Anti-Tax Avoidance 
Directive, others are purely unilateral legislations to protect national tax revenues, e.g., the 
                                                 
1 The effective tax rate of big tech companies is regularly discussed in the public media and Margarethe Vestager, 
European Commissioner for Competition, has become publicly known for her focus on illegal state aid cases 





French Digital Services Tax. Prominently, the OECD has recently proposed a far-reaching two-
pillar reform to adjust the worldwide corporate tax system.2  
Despite the proposed actions to prevent BEPS and the heightened public awareness 
against ‘aggressive’ tax planning, it is still a major challenge to credibly measure the extent of 
profit shifting and to assess its economic relevance (Blouin and Robinson, 2019; Bradbury et 
al., 2018; Tørsløv et al., 2018). In the 2015 published Final Report on “Measuring and 
Monitoring BEPS, Action 11”, the OECD introduced six indicators to measure and evaluate 
BEPS activity over time and on different levels of aggregation (OECD, 2015). The six OECD 
BEPS indicators intend to identify the scale and economic impact of BEPS, track changes in 
BEPS over time and monitor the effectiveness of measures implemented to reduce BEPS 
(OECD, 2015). In conjunction with the introduction, the OECD provides numbers for each 
indicator for the period from 2005 to 2012. These values are interpreted to provide strong 
signals on the existence and exacerbation of BEPS (Bradbury and O’Reilly, 2018). However, 
ever since these indicators have not been revised or quantitatively updated by the OECD.  
In this paper, we transparently replicate a selection of the six OECD indicators to measure 
and monitor BEPS. We provide an update to the numbers underlying the ongoing political 
debate to reform the global corporate income tax system. Our work builds on the theoretical 
evaluation of the indicators by Heckemeyer et al. (2021). The authors argue that the main 
objective of the OECD BEPS indicators, to provide understandable and easy to replicate 
measures of BEPS, comes at the price of too simplistic measures that prevent a reliable tracing 
of profit shifting. It is beyond the scope of this paper to conceptually re-assess whether the 
indicators are well suited to capture profit shifting. Our aim is to provide a numerical update 
and to point out potential pitfalls when interpreting the indicator values; because we agree that 
                                                 
2 Pillar One proposes a “Unified Approach” that is designed to allocate taxing rights to market jurisdictions (Beer 
et al., 2020; OECD, 2020a). Pillar Two, the “Global Anti-Base Erosion” (GloBE) proposal, intends to 
counteract all remaining profit shifting risks by introducing a coordinated global minimum tax and a deduction 
disallowance that should, in general, apply to all transactions (Devereux et al., 2020; OECD, 2020b). 
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a broad range of estimates on the existence and extent of profit shifting is necessary to provide 
policymakers with a solid foundation for any decision making and evaluation of policy actions. 
We categorize the six OECD BEPS indicators in three different groups based on their 
underlying data and measurement rationale. The first indicator group uses macro data to 
highlight a potential disconnect between financial and real economic activities. This category 
comprises Indicator 1: Concentration of foreign direct investment relative to the Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP). The second group uses micro data to identify surprisingly low profit 
or tax measures. This category comprises Indicator 2: Differential profit rates compared to 
effective tax rates; Indicator 3: Differential profit rates between low-tax locations and 
worldwide MNE operations; and Indicator 4: Effective tax rates of large MNE affiliates relative 
to non-MNE entities with similar characteristics. The third indicator group uses micro and 
macro data to measure the use of potential profit shifting channels. This category comprises 
Indicator 5: Concentration of high levels of royalty receipts relative to R&D spending; and 
Indicator 6: Interest expense to income ratios of MNE affiliates in high-tax locations. We revive 
one indicator from each category to shed light on its development over time. Our choice relies 
on the assessment in Heckemeyer et al. (2021) and we are confident to focus on the most 
convincing indicator in each category, namely Indicator 1, Indicator 4 and Indicator 5.  
Indicator 1 relies on macro-level data and intends to indirectly measure BEPS that takes 
place through the use of offshore tax havens. By replicating this indicator, we transparently 
show that countries that are often expected to serve as conduits or final destinations for BEPS 
have a disproportionately high amount of gross or net FDI in relation to economic activity 
measured by GDP. Extrapolating the indicator values to recent years reveals a downward 
(stable) trend for the relation of average net (gross) FDI to GDP ratios between countries with 
very high and lower concentrations of FDI relative to their economic activity.  However, since 
the indicator is unable to distinguish between real economic activity and BEPS, the estimates 
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and their variation over time may be driven by factors unrelated to BEPS, such as trade 
openness or business cycles.  
Indicator 4 employs firm-level micro data to evaluate cross-border profit shifting of 
multinational corporations and addresses the well-known drawbacks of highly aggregated 
macro data. Due to the usage of advanced statistical methods and counterfactuals, Indicator 4 
has been identified in previous work to represent the most promising approach (Heckemeyer et 
al., 2021). Replicating the OECD’s regression, we show that the ETR differential between MNE 
and non-MNE affiliates is negative and statistically significant for almost all years in our 
sample. Yet, the difference diminishes over time. In line with Bilicka (2019), we extend the 
OECD’s fourth indicator by applying a propensity score matching approach. The qualitative 
insight holds. MNEs tend to have lower effective tax rates than comparable domestic firms. 
Despite the promising approach to compare MNEs with similar domestic firms, the ETR is by 
construction not suitable to capture profit shifting. If at all, the recommended measure indicates 
certain forms of special tax incentives, loss-offsets, hybrid mismatch arrangements, tax 
negotiations or other non-profit shifting related methods to reduce a firm’s tax burden. 
Indicator 5 relies again on macro-data rather than firm-level data and is concerned with 
profit shifting through intangibles. We show that countries with high ratios of royalty receipts 
to research and development spending, which builds the rationale of Indicator 5, are countries 
with low corporate income tax rates or IP box regimes, e.g., Ireland, the Netherlands and 
Luxembourg. Moreover, the indicator remains constant over time and does not seem to react to 
recent policy actions to curb BEPS. However, the simplistic design of Indicator 5, which lacks 
any link to countries’ tax rates, is to some extent arbitrary and completely neglects potential 
real economic activities of MNEs. 
Our analysis shows that despite the OECD’s intention to provide a dashboard of 
indicators to evaluate the existence and scale of BEPS and to measure and monitor how BEPS 
evolves over time, the indicators presented in the Final Report on BEPS Action 11 are unlikely 
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to achieve this goal convincingly. Their simplistic design comes at the price of making them 
vulnerable to a number of confounding factors and economic effects that go beyond profit 
shifting. The OECD (2015) acknowledges several shortcomings of their indicators itself and 
our selected replication of three indicators confirms these issues. Overall, the indicators provide 
only limited information on the extent of profit shifting and lack the ability to precisely identify 
any changes to BEPS that result from recent tax reforms and enactments of BEPS 
countermeasures. 
With this transparent replication and update of simple indicator values that are taken as a 
rationale for global tax reforms, we contribute to the public and political debate on profit 
shifting of MNEs. However, we recommend to base policy decision on the numerous empirical 
studies that in general exploit well-specified identification strategies and granular data to show 
the existence of BEPS and to develop convincing estimates of the level of income shifting and 
the effects of BEPS countermeasures (Hanlon and Heitzman, 2010; Heckemeyer and Overesch, 
2017; Riedel, 2018; Wilde and Wilson, 2018). The academic debate on the extent of BEPS and 
its fiscal effects has recently gained momentum (Blouin and Robinson, 2019; Bradbury et al., 
2018; Tørsløv et al., 2018). Blouin and Robinson (2019) critically discuss the broad range of 
profit shifting estimates and assess different data sources. Especially, the careful evaluation of 
new data such as public country by country reporting can shed light on the extent of profit 
shifting (Clausing, 2020; Dutt et al., 2019). Moreover, analyzing different profit shifting 
channels separately allows to apply targeted measures and data sources and provides a 
promising approach to evaluate the effectiveness of specific BEPS countermeasures (Beer and 
Loeprick, 2015; Clausing, 2003; Dischinger and Riedel, 2011; Lohse and Riedel, 2013; 
Overesch, 2016; Saunders-Scott, 2015).  
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 covers the replication of Indicator 1, the 
concentration of foreign direct investment relative to GDP. The subsequent section covers the 
replication of Indicator 4, the comparison of effective tax rates of large MNE affiliates with 
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non-MNE entities. Section 4 covers the replication of Indicator 5, profit shifting through 
intangibles. Each section has three major subsections. First, we describe the methodology and 
data necessary to estimate each indicator. Second, we show the results and third, we critically 
assess the rationale and shortcomings of the indicators. Finally, section 5 concludes. 
2. Concentration of foreign direct investment relative to GDP 
“This macro-economic indicator is the ratio of the stock of FDI to a country’s GDP, measure 
of real economic activity. The indicator compares the FDI ratio in countries with relatively 
high values of FDI to GDP ratios to the same ratio in the rest of the included countries.” 
(OECD, 2015, p. 49) 
2.1. Methodology and data 
OECD Indicator 1 relies on macro-level data and intends to indirectly measure BEPS that takes 
place through the use of offshore tax havens, which is the strategy of MNEs to channel funds 
to affiliates in low-tax countries for tax purposes. In order to measure the movement of funds, 
the OECD focuses on foreign direct investments (FDI). FDI measures the amount of cross-
border investments of related affiliates and includes not only investments related to BEPS but 
also to real economic activity. As FDI patterns can generally be expected to be proportional to 
the economic size of the involved countries (Head and Ries, 2008), significantly high 
concentrations of FDI to GDP may signal BEPS. Following these considerations, Indicator 1 is 
based on the ratio of FDI stock in a country owned by foreign investors to the GDP of that 
country in a given year.  Based on the magnitude of this ratio in a pre-determined base year, 
countries are assigned to two different groups – high-ratio countries and low-ratio countries – 
and remain in this group in all years. For each group, the average of the ratio of FDI stock to 


















where subscript 𝑖 refers to countries in the high-ratio group and subscript 𝑗 to countries in the 
low-ratio group.   
The OECD distinguishes between two different measures of FDI. The net FDI of a 
country is calculated as the inward FDI stock in that country owned by foreign investors from 
OECD countries less the outward FDI stock from domestic investors that is held in OECD 
countries. Hence, this measure is supposed to identify those countries that are the ultimate 
destination of foreign direct investments for the purpose of BEPS. The OECD determines a 
threshold of 50 percent of the net FDI to GDP ratio for assigning countries into the two groups.  
The second measure of FDI relies on the gross inward FDI stock in a country owned by 
foreign investors from OECD countries. In addition to countries that are the ultimate 
destinations for FDI, this measure is intended to also capture conduit countries with a high 
proportion of FDI stock relative to GDP. The OECD defines a threshold of 200 percent of gross 
FDI to GDP for assigning countries into the two groups.   
We replicate both measures using 2012 and 2018 as the base years for group allocation. 
We also conduct the analyses by recalculating the two groups continuously on a yearly basis. 
For our calculations, we employ two different sets of data from the OECD Foreign Direct 
Investment Statistics. We firstly use FDI position data of the 3rd edition of the Benchmark 
Definition of FDI (BMD3). The data includes inward and outward FDI positions from and to 
OECD countries for the time period from 2005 to 2013. Secondly, we use FDI position data of 
the 4th edition of the Benchmark Definition of FDI (BMD4) for the time periods from 2014 to 
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2018.3 Additionally, we obtain GDP data in current US dollar for the years 2005 until 2018 
from the World Bank.4 The dispersion of countries with available data is shown in Table 1.  
Moreover, the BMD4 data allow us to observe FDI inflows and outflows of special purpose 
entities (SPEs). As defined by the OECD, SPEs are established in economies other than those 
in which the parent firm is resident and engage primarily in international transactions but in 
few or no local operations. Therefore, FDI in SPEs might be considered especially BEPS-
motivated. 
2.2. Results 
First, we replicate the OECD’s estimation of Indicator 1, taking net FDI to GDP as the measure 
and 2012 as the base year. For 2012, we have data on 202 countries, of which 14 are assigned 
to the high-ratio group. Unsurprisingly, members of the high-ratio group are countries with low 
or no CIT rate or preferential tax systems, e.g., the Bahamas, Cayman Islands or Ireland. The 
structure of the high-ratio group is depicted in Table 2 Panel A. Using the BMD3 data from 
2005 to 2012, we can closely replicate the results of the OECD, which are shown in Table 3 
Panel A and graphically plotted in Figure 1. In 2011, the indicator shows that the average ratio 
of net FDI to GDP of the high-ratio countries was about 43 times higher than the average ratio 
of low-ratio countries. The indicator values are depicted in Figure 2. However, we do not find 
the OECD’s sharp increase in the indicator value in the year 2012, in which our estimate 
increases to 54.8 in contrast to 99.2 estimated by the OECD. Employing the BMD4 data from 
2013 onwards, we see a drop in the indicator value to 23.9, which then steadily decreases to 
11.7 in 2018.  
When taking 2018 as the base year for group allocation, we identify 13 countries in the 
high-ratio group, which is depicted in the right column of Table 2 Panel A. In 2005 and 2006, 
                                                 
3 Since September 2014, the OECD has been collecting FDI statistics from member countries according to the 
updated benchmark definition BMD4. The methodology of the FDI statistics published between 1990 and end-
2013 relates to the 3rd edition of the benchmark definition. 
4 World Bank indicator code: NY.GDP.MKTP.CD 
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the average ratio of net FDI to GDP of the high-ratio group was only marginally higher. After 
this time, we find a steady increase to an indicator value of around 14, which remains stable 
until 2018.  
Second, we replicate the OECD’s indicator using the gross FDI to GDP ratio. The OECD 
claims that by using gross FDI values, the indicator also captures those countries that function 
as conduits for BEPS. When using 2012 as the base year, ten out of 202 countries are assigned 
to the high-ratio group and, indeed, countries such as Ireland, the Netherlands and Luxembourg 
are part of the high-ratio group which are considered as members of the top ten conduit 
countries (van ‘t Riet and Lejour, 2018). Table 2 Panel B displays the list of all countries in the 
high-ratio group. From 2005 to 2012, we are able to closely replicate the OECD’s estimates. 
Table 3 Panel B depicts the indicator values. In 2005, the gross FDI to GDP ratio of the high-
ratio countries is about 12 times higher than the ratio of the low-ratio countries and doubles to 
24 until 2012. In the following years, the indicator value remains at a level of about 23. Figure 
3 shows that in 2018, the amount of gross FDI per euro of GDP in the high-ratio group of 
countries was, on average, 19 times higher than the average ratio for the remaining countries. 
When taking 2018 as the base year, eleven countries belong to the high-ratio group and Figure 
4 shows that the indicator trend over time is steadily increasing and doubles between 2005 and 
2018. 
In addition, we repeat both analyses allocating countries to into high and low-ratio groups 
on a continuous basis every year. For the net FDI analysis, the indicator value follows closely 
that of taking 2012 as base year, as depicted in Figure 5. The gross FDI indicator, which is 
shown in Figure 6 ranges between 60 and 100 for the years 2005 to 2010. This is about five 
times the value of that when taking 2012 as base year. In year 2011, the indicator value drops 
to 24 and remains in this magnitude for the rest of the sample period. 
As robustness test, we replicate our analysis keeping only those countries for which we 
have data available over the whole period from 2005 to 2018 and find very similar results. 
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Furthermore, we exploit FDI positions of SPEs in the time period from 2013 to 2018. Due to 
the variation in data availability, we do not find consistent results. Nevertheless, the prior 
identified countries in the high-ratio groups are again those countries with the highest ratios. 
2.3. Rationale and shortcomings 
Indicator 1 relies on the assumption that a country’s magnitude of (inward) FDI stock to GDP 
provides an indication of BEPS. Specifically, MNEs are supposed to channel funds to low-tax 
countries for tax reasons and not for reasons of real economic activity. Indeed, prior literature 
provides evidence on the adverse relationship of taxes and FDI (Buettner et al., 2018; Desai et 
al., 2004; Janeba, 1995). BEPS related FDI is expected to create a disproportion between the 
FDI in a country and the economic activity of this country, measured by GDP. The indicator 
intends to capture this disproportion. However, the definition of the indicator has many 
drawbacks. First, FDI includes both investments related to BEPS and investments related to 
real economic activity. Since the indicator is unable to distinguish between these types of 
investment, the estimates and their variation over time may be driven by factors unrelated to 
BEPS, such as trade openness or business cycles. Second, the indicator does not provide any 
direct linkage to countries’ tax rates which is the key driver for BEPS related FDI. Third, the 
indicator values highly depend on the specific threshold and base year to assign countries to the 
two different groups. This is highlighted by the high indicator value dispersion when using 
continuous base years. Overall, we explicitly point out that the results have to be treated with 
caution and conclude that Indicator 1 does not provide convincing (indirect) evidence of BEPS. 
3. Effective tax rates of large MNE affiliates compared to non-MNE entities 
 “Indicator 4 compares the ETRs of large MNE affiliates with non-MNE entities with similar 
characteristics in the same country. The indicator measures the extent to which large MNE 
affiliates have lower ETRs than comparable non-MNE entities.” 
(OECD, 2015, p. 58). 
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3.1. Methodology and data 
This OECD indicator relies on firm-level micro data to evaluate cross-border profit shifting of 
MNEs and addresses the well-known drawbacks of highly aggregated macro data that is used 
to estimate the first OECD Indicator. In contrast to purely domestic firms, which operate only 
in one country, MNEs have incentives to relocate income to affiliates located in countries with 
lower corporate tax rates. The fourth OECD indicator exploits this difference between domestic 
and multinational corporations. Domestic firms serve as a counterfactual benchmark group to 
assess the extent of income shifting by comparable multinationals. The indicator uses financial 
data of multinational and domestic firms and compares the average effective tax rate (ETR) of 
both groups. The OECD expects that the ETR of MNEs is, on average, lower than that of 
comparable domestic firms (OECD, 2015).  
The presumption of lower ETRs for MNEs is tested using the following regression 
framework:5  
𝐸𝑇𝑅𝑓,𝑐,𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽1𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑓,𝑐,𝑖,𝑡𝑥 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑓,𝑐,𝑖,𝑡 𝑥 𝑀𝑁𝐸𝑓,𝑐,𝑖 𝑥 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑋𝑓,𝑐,𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛿𝑖 + 𝛿𝑐,𝑡 
where 𝐸𝑇𝑅𝑓,𝑐,𝑖,𝑡 is the effective tax rate for firm 𝑓 in country 𝑐, industry 𝑖 and year 𝑡. The ETR 
is the ratio of tax payments to earnings before income and taxes (EBIT) in percent. 𝐿𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑓,𝑐,𝑖,𝑡 
is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for firms with more than 250 employees and 0 
otherwise. Multinational firms are identified using the dummy variable 𝑀𝑁𝐸𝑓,𝑐,𝑖. The group 
structure is based on the ORBIS ownership information at the end of year 2016 and we restrict 
the sample to majority owned firms and headquarters. The group structure is assumed to be 
constant in our panel.6 We require a multinational group to have at least one cross-border 
relationship. 𝛽2, the estimated coefficient of the interaction between large and multinational 
                                                 
5 Note that the regression framework deviates slightly from the regression stated in Annex 3. A1 in OECD (2015). 
We only exclude the dummy variable small, which is the exact counterpart to the variable large. We further 
directly interact the coefficient of interest (and its baseline effect) with a year dummy to obtain yearly estimates, 
as presented in Table 2.3. Indicator 4 in OECD (2015). 
6 This assumption is commonly used in the literature on profit shifting. Many changes in the ownership structure 
result from data improvements by the data provider.   
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firms, is the coefficient of interest and the estimated value of Indicator 4. We exclude the 
baseline effect of multinationals on the ETR to obtain a direct estimate of the OECD’s verbally 
expressed difference between the ETR of large multinational and large domestic corporations. 
 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 is a dummy variable that is interacted with the coefficient of interest to provide yearly 
estimates. 𝑋𝑓,𝑐,𝑖,𝑡 is a vector of firm-specific control variables. It includes the size of a firm, 
measured as the logarithm of total assets, the profitability ratio of a firm and an estimate for the 
degree of firms’ innovation activities. We use the ratio of intangible to total assets as a proxy 
for firms’ innovativeness in contrast to the number of patents that is used by the OECD. 
Furthermore, a dummy variable that indicates if a firm is the global ultimate owner controls for 
a firm’s position in the group. 𝛿𝑖 are industry fixed effects at the two-digit NACE classification 
and 𝛿𝑐,𝑡 are country-year fixed effects. 
In line with the OECD, we use unconsolidated financial data from the well-known Bureau 
van Dijk ORBIS database to replicate the estimates of Indicator 4. Our panel starts in 2000 and 
has data up to 2016. Similar to other studies on profit shifting, we exclude observations with 
implausible financial data such as total assets below 0 and exclude all observations that have a 
negative effective tax rate or one above 100 percent (Beer and Loeprick, 2015; Dischinger and 
Riedel, 2011; Huizinga and Laeven, 2008). Furthermore, we restrict the sample to firms with a 
profitability ratio, which is determined as EBIT to total assets, between 0 and 100 percent, i.e., 
we exclude loss-making firms and overly profitable corporations. Finally, we exclude all firms 
with less than three years of basic accounting data available in our panel (Beer and Loeprick, 
2015).  
3.2. Results 
Our panel from 2000 to 2016 consists of more than 800,000 firms, thereof about 18 
percent are multinational firms. Descriptive statistics are depicted in Table 4. In our baseline 
regression, depicted in Table 5, we estimate large MNEs to have a 0.96 percentage points lower 
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ETR than comparable large domestic firms, which is significant at the one percent level. This 
estimate decreases to about -1.5 if we only consider the period from 2000 until 2010 that 
corresponds to the OECD sample period. Yet, the OECD estimates that the ETR of large MNEs 
is, on average, three percentage points below the ETR of comparable large domestic 
corporations (OECD, 2015). We replicate the yearly estimates of the ETR differential in Table 
6. The interaction coefficient of large and multinational corporations is directly comparable to 
the estimates of Indicator 4 in the final report on BEPS Action 11. Our estimates on the 
differential between large MNE affiliates and non-MNE entities are considerably below the 
annual estimates of the OECD. We plot the yearly coefficients and the confidence interval in 
Figure 7. Yet, we also see a negative and statistically significant ETR differential for almost all 
years. The ETR differential follows for the second half of our sample period – that extends 
beyond the OECD’s period – an upward trend and converges towards zero.  
We conduct several robustness tests. First, we restrict the sample to specific regions. In 
column 3 of Table 6, we only consider firms located in an OECD country, and in column 4, we 
only consider firms located in EU countries. The results do not change materially. Second, we 
change the outcome variable to tax payments over total assets to account for the critique on the 
chosen outcome variable in the OECD regression approach (Heckemeyer et al., 2021). The 
regression is depicted in Table 7. The relative tax payments to total assets are, on average, only 
significantly lower for large MNEs than for large domestic firms in the early sample period. 
3.3. Additional analysis – Propensity score matching 
The OECD’s regression approach to compare domestic and multinational corporations is 
an intuitive empirical methodology and the differences to alternative, more sophisticated, 
matching estimates are presumably of minor empirical importance (Angrist and Pischke, 2008). 
Yet, the quality of the comparison between multinational and domestic firms crucially hinges 
on the matching quality, i.e., the similarity and comparability of the two groups is essential for 
any inferences. A well-established method of creating a control group that is as similar as 
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possible to the treaded group in a non-experimental setting is the so-called propensity score 
matching (Abadie and Imbens, 2006, 2016; Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983; Rubin, 1974). Bilicka 
(2019) applies propensity score matching for a sample of UK MNEs and domestic firms to 
evaluate BEPS. The matching process follows a two-step procedure. First, the likelihood of 
firms being domestic or multinational is estimated based on observable characteristics. Second, 
domestic and multinational firms are matched based on the estimated propensity scores. The 
method excludes firms that are very unlikely to serve as a comparable benchmark group. The 
benefits of the propensity score matching approach go beyond the OECD’s regression 
framework. First, a key advantage is the possibility to assess the similarity of the two groups of 
MNE affiliates and non-MNE entities at a glance after the first matching step. Second, the 
propensity score matching allows to fine tune the proximity of the two groups along the 
observable matching dimensions. Third, a successful matching allows to directly compare the 
variable of interest, here the average ETR, between the two groups. 
Hence, we extend the OECD’s fourth indicator by applying a propensity score matching 
approach to estimate the average treatment effect (ATE), i.e. the differential between the 
average ETR of MNE affiliates and non-MNE entities or the effect of being a multinational 
firm, on the effective tax rates. We borrow from Bilicka (2019) and match MNEs to domestic 
firms. We match firms based on the logarithm of total assets, the logarithm of firm’s 
productivity, the debt to equity ratio and the ratio of intangible to total assets within year, 
industry and country. All observable characteristics, which we use in the matching process, 
should be similar in the matched sample. Table 8 shows how the similarity of the two groups 
improves in the matched sample. A solid sign of matching quality is a standardized difference 
between the samples of close to zero and a variance ratio of about one. On average, our matched 
sample approaches this standard for all observable matching characteristics within each country 
industry and year matching cluster. We then estimate the average treatment effect for each year 
in our sample. Table 9 depicts the yearly estimated treatment effect of being a multinational 
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firm on the ETR. We have plotted the estimated average treatment effects in Figure 8. The 
estimated ETR differences range between -0.13 and -1.02 percentage points and do not follow 
a specific trend in our sample period. In comparison to the regression estimates, the differentials 
are slightly smaller in the first half of our sample period. Moreover, in several years the 
estimates are statistically indistinguishable from zero. The estimated effective tax rate 
differentials depend – as the choice of control variables in the OECD regression approach – on 
the specific observable characteristics used for the propensity score matching. Hence, 
alternative controls or matching characteristics could lead to differences in the magnitude of 
the estimated ETR differentials.  
3.4. Rationale and shortcomings 
Indicator 4 is the only indicator that includes the usage of counterfactuals as control group. This 
is the key advantage of Indicator 4 in contrast to all other suggested indicators to measure and 
monitor BEPS. However, the specifications of this indicator as defined by the OECD include 
other shortcomings that go beyond the matching quality that we have addressed in the preceding 
subsection.  
It is highly questionable if the dependent variable ETR is a suitable measure to capture 
profit shifting. The ETR, which relates to tax expenditures over reported pre-tax profits, does 
not capture any of the known profit shifting channels such as transfer pricing, debt shifting nor 
royalty allocation (Heckemeyer et al., 2021). Specifically, the ETR’s denominator is affected 
by profit shifting. By construction it can – if at all – indicate certain forms of special tax 
incentives, loss-offsets, hybrid mismatch arrangements, tax negotiations or other non-profit 
shifting related methods to reduce a firm’s tax burden. Moreover, the unconsolidated ETR is 
rarely a key performance indicator of multinational corporations. Managers, and stakeholders 
rather focus on a group’s overall tax burden, i.e. the consolidated ETR. In its current design, 
the indicator also neglects any differences within the group of multinational firms. While 
groups with affiliates in tax haven locations can be presumed to engage more actively in profit 
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shifting, groups without links to low-tax jurisdictions might not have a strong incentive to 
relocate income. 
4. Profit shifting through intangibles 
“The indicator compares the average ratio of royalties received to R&D expenditures for a 
group of high-ratio countries to the average ratio for the other countries in the sample.” 
(OECD, 2015, p. 60) 
4.1. Methodology and Data 
OECD Indicator 5 relies on macro-data rather than firm-level data and is concerned with profit 
shifting through intangibles. Profit shifting through intangibles is commonly defined as the 
strategy of transferring IP from high-tax to low-tax countries for tax purposes after it has been 
developed in high-tax countries. Using this structure, affiliates in high-tax countries pay 
(potentially high amounts of) royalties for the use of the IP to affiliates in a low-tax country. 
The indicator shall indirectly capture the extent of BEPS through IP transfer. Following the 
logic of transferring IP to low-tax countries for tax purposes, IP receiving countries should have 
a higher ratio of royalty receipts to research and development (R&D) spending compared to 
those countries where the IP was developed. For this reason, in a first step, the ratio of royalty 
receipts relative to R&D spending is measured for each country. Next, countries are assigned 
into two groups based on their concentration in a given year. Countries with a ratio above 50 
percent are assigned to the group of high-ratio countries while the other countries form the 
group of low-ratio countries. By dividing the average ratio of the high-ratio group with the 

















where the subscript 𝑖 refers to members of the high-ratio group and subscript 𝑗 to members of 
the low-ratio group in year 𝑡.  
In its 2015 report, the OECD uses the year 2011 as the base year to identify the 
composition of the high-ratio and low-ratio group, which is held constant in the other years. 
We replicate the indicator using 2011 and 2017 as the base year.7 We also replicate the indicator 
by recalculating the two groups continuously on a yearly basis. Furthermore, we check the 
robustness of our results through different tests.  
We obtain country-level data on receipts for the use of IP as balance of payments in 
current US dollar for the years 2005 to 2018 from the World Bank.8 Moreover, we use data on 
the gross domestic expenditure on R&D from the UNESCO Institute for Statistics (UIS.Stat).9 
The data availability is depicted in Table 10. 
4.2. Results 
First, we replicate the OECD’s estimation of royalty receipts to R&D spending and take 2011 
as the base year for allocating countries into high-ratio and low-ratio groups. In 2011, data is 
available for 69 countries, of which eight countries are assigned to the high-ratio group. The 
structure of the high-ratio group is shown in Table 11. In fact, members of the high-ratio group 
are European countries with low corporate income tax rates or preferential tax systems. For 
example, Ireland, the Netherlands and Luxembourg are part of this group.  
In the year 2011, the high-ratio countries received EUR 1.53 of royalty for every EUR 1 
invested in R&D while the low-ratio countries received only EUR 0.18. Thus, the ratio for the 
high-ratio countries is almost nine times larger than that of the low-ratio countries, which leads 
to an indicator value of 8.7. Table 12 provides annual estimates of Indicator 5. Over the years, 
                                                 
7 We take 2017 instead of 2018 as the base year for data availability reasons. 
8 World Bank indicator code: BX.GSR.ROYL.CD 
9 The OECD names the World Development Indicators as its data source on R&D expenditures. However, we 
could only find data on R&D expenditures as a percentage of GDP. Using this data would have added even larger 
measurement error to our calculations. We verify our results using R&D spending data from the OECD, where 
we obtain similar results. 
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the indicator does not vary significantly. In 2005, the indicator takes a value of 7.7, which 
increases until 2010 to 9.1. After being stable for about three years, the indicator increases to 
11.9 in 2015 but decreases again to 9.8 in the year 2017. Figure 9 plots the development of 
Indicator 5 graphically. In contrast to the estimates of the OECD, our estimated Indicator 5 
value is higher but we do not observe a strong increase over time. Our estimates confirm that 
some countries receive comparably very high shares of royalties to R&D spending. In 2011, 
the eight countries in the high-ratio group received about 13.4 percent of the overall royalties 
of the 69 countries examined. 
Second, we take the year 2017 as a base year for group allocation to replicate the OECD’s 
results. The group of high-ratio countries consists of nine countries, which are named in Table 
11. Table 12 and Figure 10 depict the estimates. From 2005 to 2018, the indicator ranges 
between 3.5 and 5.7, taking its peak in 2017. Again, the indicator values seem to be stable over 
time and have about the same size as the OECD’s estimates. The high-ratio countries received 
EUR 0.98 of royalties for every EUR 1 invested in R&D in 2017, while the low-ratio countries 
received only EUR 0.17.  
Third, we refrain from pre-determined group allocation but re-estimate the allocation of 
the high-ratio and low-ratio group every year. As shown in Figure 9, the indicator values range 
between 5.7 and 10.7 without a clear pattern over the years. The greater dispersion can be 
explained by the annual re-calculation of the sample for the indicator estimation. Nevertheless, 
the values do not exceed or fall below those of the samples with base years.  
Finally, we test the robustness of our analysis using OECD data on R&D spending. The 
results are depicted in Table 13. Even though the R&D data are only available for, on average, 
37 countries, the results verify our previous findings. Furthermore, we replicate our analysis 
using only countries for which we have at least 10 years or 14 years of data available. Again, 
the values of the indicator do not change significantly. Lastly, we also obtain similar indicator 
results if we take the lag values of R&D spending for estimation. We do this to adjust for the 
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possibility that between the time of receipts from royalty and the time of R&D spending a time 
gap exists.  
4.3. Rationale and shortcomings 
Previous research has shown that MNEs transfer intellectual property to affiliates located in 
countries with relatively lower corporate tax rates for BEPS reasons (Amberger and Osswald, 
2020; Dischinger and Riedel, 2011; Karkinsky and Riedel, 2012). Indicator 5 is based on this 
rationale and aims to measure BEPS as the income stream generated by IP relative to the R&D 
expenditures in a country. Specifically, this assumes that MNEs use the resources of industrial 
countries, which often levy higher corporate tax rates, for complex R&D tasks and, 
subsequently, transfer the developed IP to countries with lower tax rates, causing a deviation 
between royalty payments and R&D expenditures.  
However, the simplicity of the indicator leads to various shortcomings that need to be 
considered when interpreting the results. First, Indicator 5 is an indirect measure of BEPS and 
no assertion can be made about the scale of BEPS. Second, royalty payments may not only be 
linked to R&D spending but also to the use of trademarks, copyrights or franchises 
(Heckemeyer et al., 2021). Third, it is assumed that MNEs shift IP for tax reasons. However, 
the definition of the indicator neither provides a direct link to taxes nor does it capture the 
movement of IP. Thus, this indicator could, for example, also proxy R&D productivity by 
capturing the difference between countries with highly valuable R&D and less valuable R&D. 
Fourth, the proposed tax planning strategy of transferring IP from R&D countries to low-tax 
countries may be limited and undesirable since exit-taxation could eliminate potential tax 
benefits (Ernst and Spengel, 2011). Fifth, even though we try to account for time lags between 
R&D and IP output in robustness tests, the true time period is unobservable and potentially very 
diverse. Hence, the indicator variation over time might be misleading. Fifth, this indicator is on 
the aggregated country level and does not account for country size. Thus, small countries might 
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be overrepresented. Lastly, the group assignment of the indicator depends on an arbitrarily 
chosen threshold without taking other factors into account.  
5. Conclusion 
Profit shifting of multinational firms is a pressing topic in the public debate, academic research 
and on the political agenda. Yet, measuring the extent of profit shifting and assessing the 
economic relevance of it is a major challenge. In its 2015 published Final Report on “Measuring 
and Monitoring BEPS, Action 11”, the OECD has introduced six indicators to measure and 
evaluate BEPS activity over time and on different levels of aggregation. We replicate one 
indicator from each of the three subordinate categories and update the numbers underlying the 
ongoing political debate to reform the global corporate tax system. We build on the conceptual 
evaluation of the indicators by Heckemeyer et al. (2021) and focus our analysis on the most 
convincing indicators: Indicator 1 (Disconnect between financial and real economic activities), 
Indicator 4 (MNE vs. “comparable” non-MNE effective tax rate differentials) and Indicator 5 
(Profit shifting through intangibles). 
Following the OECD’s specification, we closely replicate the estimates of Indicator 1, 
which intends to indirectly measure BEPS through the use of offshore tax havens. We 
transparently show that countries with low or no corporate income tax (CIT) rates or 
preferential tax systems, e.g., the Bahamas, Cayman Islands or Ireland, have very high 
concentrations of FDI relative to their GDP. Extrapolating the indicator to recent years, the net 
FDI to GDP ratio shows a moderately decreasing trend and the gross FDI to GDP ratio remains 
at a stable level. The replicated regression estimates of Indicator 4 show that multinational firms 
have lower effective tax rates than domestic firms. This difference diminishes over time. Our 
annual estimated ETR differential is lower even in the years that overlap with the OECD sample 
period. We repeat the analysis using a propensity score matching approach, finding similar 
results. The replication of Indicator 5, which is concerned with profit shifting through 
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intangibles, shows a stable trend of the annual indicator estimates that extends beyond the 
OECD’s sample period. Similar to the first indicator, we transparently show that countries with 
high ratios of royalty receipts to research and development (R&D) spending are countries with 
low corporate income tax rates or IP box regimes, e.g., Ireland, the Netherlands and 
Luxembourg. 
Overall, the OECD’s intend to provide a convincing and simple dashboard of indicators 
that allows to evaluate the existence and scale of BEPS and to measure and monitor how BEPS 
evolves over time comes with a number of shortcomings. The indicators highly dependent on 
the underlying assumptions, the availability of data and may be influenced by various 
confounding factors beyond BEPS. Hence, the informative value of the indicators for 
policymakers is limited. Yet, transparent updates on the existence and extent of BEPS are 
important for the ongoing public and academic debate on the necessity to reform the corporate 
income tax system. We endorse the ongoing empirical research that exploits well-specified 
identification strategies and granular data to measure the existence and extent of BEPS and 
propose to tackle the issue from different angles. Only multidimensional approaches allow to 
develop a holistic view of BEPS and to evaluate ongoing proposals to reform the global 
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Figure 1: Indicator 1 – Net FDI to GDP by groups 
    
Notes: The green line depicts the trend of the average net FDI to GDP ratio for the group of countries that have a 
ratio above 0.5 in 2012. The blue line depicts the trend of the average net FDI to GDP ratio for the group of 
countries that have a ratio above 0.5 in 2018. The black dotted line displays the average ratio of the remaining 
(low-ratio) countries.    
 
Figure 2: Indicator 1 – Net FDI Indicator trend 
Notes: The green line shows the trend of Indicator 1 using net FDI to GDP as measure and 2012 as base year. 
The blue line uses 2018 as base year for group allocation. The black line shows the indicator’s trend estimated 






















































Figure 3: Indicator 1 – Gross FDI to GDP by groups 
    
Notes: The green line depicts the trend of the average gross FDI to GDP ratio for the group of countries that 
have a ratio above 2.0 in 2012. The blue line depicts the trend of the average gross FDI to GDP ratio for the 
group of countries that have a ratio above 2.0 in 2018. The black dotted line displays the average ratio of the 
remaining (low-ratio) countries.    
  
Figure 4: Indicator 1 - Gross FDI Indicator trend 
Notes: The green line shows the trend of Indicator 1 using net FDI to GDP as measure and 2012 as base year. 
The blue line uses 2018 as base year for group allocation. The black line shows the indicator’s trend estimated 






















































Figure 5: Indicator 1 - Net FDI Indicator with continuous base year 
Notes: The green line shows the trend of Indicator 1 using net FDI to GDP as measure and 2012 as base year. 
The blue line uses 2018 as base year for group allocation. The orange line recalculates the group composition 
every year. The black line shows the indicator’s trend estimated by the OECD in 2015. 
 
Figure 6: Indicator 1 - Gross FDI Indicator with continuous base year 
Notes: The green line shows the trend of Indicator 1 using gross FDI to GDP as measure and 2012 as base year. 
The blue line uses 2018 as base year for group allocation. The orange line recalculates the group composition 
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Figure 7: Indicator 4 - Trends in international tax planning, 2000-2016 
 
Notes: The dark blue line depicts the annual regression estimates for Indicator 4 and the light blue lines frame the 
95% confidence interval.  
 
Figure 8: Indicator 4 – Trends in international ETR differences (average treatment 
effects) 
 
Notes: The dark blue line depicts the annual regression estimates for the ATE, based on the two-step propensity 



















































































































































































Figure 9: Indicator 5 - Royalty receipts to R&D spending by groups 
 
Notes: The green line and blue line depict the trend of the average royalty receipts to R&D spending ratio for the 
group of countries that have a ratio above 0.5 in 2011 and 2017, respectively. The orange line depicts the trend of 
for the group of countries that have a ratio above 0.5 in the particular year. The black dotted line displays the 
average ratio of the remaining (low-ratio) countries.    
 
Figure 10: Indicator 5 – Indicator trend 
Notes: The green line and blue line shows the trend of Indicator 5 using 2012 or 2018 as base year for group 
allocation. The orange line redefines the group allocation every year. The black line shows the indicator’s trend 


























































Table 1: Indicator 1 – Country-Year distribution 
Panel A Net FDI 















    
Panel B Gross FDI 















Notes: The table shows the number of countries with available data per year. Panel A refers to the net FDI to 
GDP measure. Panel B refers to the gross FDI to GDP measure of Indicator 5. The years 2005 until 2012 rely 





Table 2: Indicator 1 – Countries in high-ratio group 
Panel A Net FDI 
  Base Year 2012 Base Year 2018 
1 Bahamas Barbados 
2 Barbados Cyprus 
3 Bermuda Dominica 
4 Cayman Islands Ireland 
5 Hong Kong Marshall Islands 
6 Hungary Mauritius 
7 Ireland Mongolia 
8 Liberia Netherlands 
9 Malta Panama 
10 Marshall Islands Papua New Guinea 
11 Mauritius St. Kitts and Nevis 
12 Singapore Singapore 
13 St. Kitts and Nevis Turks and Caicos Islands 
14 Trinidad and Tobago   
      
Panel B Gross FDI 
  Base Year 2012 Base Year 2018 
1 Bahamas Bahamas 
2 Barbados Barbados 
3 Bermuda Curacao 
4 Cayman Islands Cyprus 
5 Curacao Ireland 
6 Ireland Luxembourg 
7 Luxembourg Malta 
8 Malta Marshall Islands 
9 Marshall Islands Mauritius 
10 Netherlands Netherlands 
11   Switzerland 
Notes: The table shows the countries belonging to the high-ratio group. Countries with a ratio above 50 percent 
are assigned to the group of high-ratio countries while the other countries form the group of low-ratio countries. 
In Panel A the group structure is shown for the net FDI to GDP measure using base years 2012 and 2018, 
respectively. In Panel B the group structure is shown for the gross FDI to GDP measure using base years 2012 
















Table 3: Indicator 1 - Results 
Panel A Net FDI 
Year 
OECD Base Year 2012 Base Year 2018 
Indicator High Low Indicator High Low Indicator 
2005 37,6 79% 2% 37,5 4% 3% 1,3 
2006 36,3 89% 2% 43,1 6% 3% 1,8 
2007 37,4 101% 2% 44,6 26% 3% 8,0 
2008 31,9 102% 3% 31,3 28% 4% 6,8 
2009 41,9 134% 3% 42,3 21% 5% 4,5 
2010 44,9 143% 3% 44,3 23% 5% 4,8 
2011 43,1 132% 3% 41,4 36% 4% 8,5 
2012 99,2 157% 3% 54,8 39% 4% 9,2 
2013   102% 4% 23,9 63% 4% 14,3 
2014   105% 6% 16,3 68% 7% 10,4 
2015   100% 7% 14,6 88% 7% 13,3 
2016   96% 7% 13,9 69% 7% 9,9 
2017   91% 7% 12,9 102% 6% 15,8 
2018   77% 7% 11,7 88% 6% 14,9 
                
Panel B Gross FDI 
Year 
OECD Base Year 2012 Base Year 2018 
Indicator High Low Indicator High Low Indicator 
2005 13,0 175% 14% 12,4 125% 14% 8,9 
2006 13,9 202% 15% 13,1 145% 15% 9,4 
2007 15,9 247% 16% 15,0 167% 17% 9,9 
2008 17,4 262% 16% 16,5 176% 16% 10,9 
2009 18,9 323% 18% 17,7 207% 19% 11,0 
2010 21,1 349% 18% 19,9 215% 18% 11,9 
2011 23,4 359% 16% 22,1 215% 17% 12,8 
2012 26,7 406% 17% 24,4 240% 17% 14,0 
2013   504% 21% 23,5 332% 21% 15,6 
2014   518% 23% 22,5 363% 22% 16,3 
2015   602% 25% 24,0 417% 24% 17,2 
2016   612% 26% 23,5 434% 25% 17,4 
2017   660% 27% 24,4 482% 26% 18,7 
2018   524% 25% 20,8 422% 23% 18,0 
Notes: The table depicts the values of Indicator 1. In Panel A net FDI is used to estimate the indicator. In Panel 
B gross FDI is used. Column 2 shows Indicator values estimated by the OECD (OECD (2015)). For each 
country, the ratio of FDI to GDP is calculated. Based on this ratio in a pre-defined base year, countries are 
assigned to high-ratio groups or low-ratio groups. The threshold values amounts to 50% in Panel A and 200% 
in Panel B. In columns 3 to 5 2012 is the base year and column 3 and 4 show the ratio of the countries in the 
high-ratio group and low-ratio group, respectively. Column 5 displays the estimated indicator value. In columns 
6 to 8, 2018 is the base year and column 6 and 7 show the ratio of the countries in the high-ratio group and low-
ratio group, respectively. Column 8 displays the estimated indicator value. The years 2005 until 2012 rely on 







Table 4: Indicator 4 - Descriptive Statistics 
Variable  n Mean SD Min Median Max 
ETR 5,048,716 31.248 20.075 0.000 28.073 100.000 
Employees 5,048,716 136 2,477 1 15 1,477,200 
Large dummy 5,048,716 0.075 0.263 0.000 0.000 1.000 
MNE dummy 5,048,716 0.220 0.414 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Profitability 5,048,716 0.116 0.122 0.000 0.077 1.000 
Total Assets (TOAS) 5,048,716 123,32.850 31,017.534 0.249 1,579.236 158,697.237 
Innovation 5,048,716 0.054 0.117 0.000 0.007 0.785 
Position in group 5,048,716 0.684 0.465 0.000 1.000 1.000 
Notes: The table depicts the descriptive statistics. ETR is the ratio of tax payments to profit and loss before tax. 
Employees is the number of staff per firm. Large is a dummy variable that is equal to one for all firms with more 
than 250 employees. MNE is a dummy variable that is equal to one for all firms that belong to a group with a least 
one cross-border relationship. Profitability is the ratio of earnings before income and taxes (EBIT) to total assets 
(TOAS), innovation is the ratio of intangible fixed assets (IFAS) to total assets and position in group is a dummy 
variable that is equal to one for all headquarters. ETR, Profitability, Innovation are measured in percent. Employees 
in total numbers and total assets in thousand Euro.  
 
 
Table 5: Indicator 4 - Baseline regression 
Variable (1) (2) 
Large 0.5886*** 0.7142*** 
  (0.0855) (0.1059) 
Large x MNE -0.9606*** -1.4648*** 
  (0.0982) (0.1221) 
Profitability (EBIT/TOAS) -23.4167*** -19.0960*** 
  (0.0940) (0.1095) 
log Total Assets (TOAS) -0.2308*** -0.1130*** 
  (0.0088) (0.0105) 
Innovation (IFAS/TOAS) -2.3959*** -3.5671*** 
  (0.1010) (0.1148) 
Position in Group -0.7428*** -0.8877*** 
  (0.0300) (0.0352) 
Country-Year Fixed Effects x x 
Industry Fixed Effects x x 
Time limited to 2010   x 
R2 (within) 0.362 0.363 
Number of firms 1,001,429 751,148 
Observations 5,048,716 2,796,459 
Notes: This table presents the regression results for OECD BEPS Indicator 4. The dependent variable is the 
effective tax rate (ETR). Large is a dummy variable that is equal to one for all firms with more than 250 
employees. MNE is a dummy variable that is equal to one for all firms that belong to a group with a least one 
cross-border relationship. Profitability is the ratio of earnings before income and taxes (EBIT) to total assets 
(TOAS), innovation is the ratio of intangible fixed assets (IFAS) to total assets and position in group is a 
dummy variable that is equal to one for all headquarters. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1 and 
99 percentile. We report standard errors clustered by firm in parentheses. ***, **, * denote statistical 
significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent level, respectively.   
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Table 6: Indicator 4 - Yearly estimates 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
2000:Large -0.7736* -1.0850*** -1.5108*** -2.2380*** 
  (0.3954) (0.3939) (0.4585) (0.4781) 
2001:Large 0.3147 -0.1126 -0.5575 -1.5111*** 
  (0.3462) (0.3458) (0.4338) (0.4350) 
2002:Large 2.1868*** 2.0076*** 0.9700*** -0.5627 
  (0.2877) (0.2872) (0.3543) (0.3896) 
2003:Large 1.9998*** 1.7776*** 1.1361*** 0.2366 
  (0.2496) (0.2487) (0.3303) (0.3794) 
2004:Large 2.4646*** 2.3151*** 1.6728*** 0.8735** 
  (0.2148) (0.2143) (0.3107) (0.3476) 
2005:Large 1.6306*** 1.4252*** 0.6555** -0.1470 
  (0.2075) (0.2087) (0.2853) (0.3082) 
2006:Large 1.7789*** 1.4896*** 0.0942 -0.4781* 
  (0.1828) (0.1835) (0.2573) (0.2764) 
2007:Large 0.7786*** 0.3788** -0.7637*** -1.3707*** 
  (0.1840) (0.1859) (0.2478) (0.2505) 
2008:Large 1.0072*** 0.6677*** 0.1081 -0.9128*** 
  (0.1883) (0.1897) (0.2579) (0.2527) 
2009:Large 0.3695* 0.1497 -0.5623** -1.3280*** 
  (0.1894) (0.1901) (0.2498) (0.2600) 
2010:Large 0.2563 0.0688 -0.2922 -1.0931*** 
  (0.1759) (0.1767) (0.2338) (0.2493) 
2011:Large 1.3874*** 1.1905*** 0.8417*** 0.3256 
  (0.1664) (0.1671) (0.2229) (0.2426) 
2012:Large 0.9766*** 0.8262*** 0.2858 -0.1289 
  (0.1652) (0.1659) (0.2246) (0.2493) 
2013:Large 0.4664*** 0.3126** -0.1981 -1.0866*** 
  (0.1581) (0.1591) (0.2142) (0.2350) 
2014:Large 0.4995*** 0.3621** 0.2058 -0.8728*** 
  (0.1556) (0.1565) (0.2110) (0.2286) 
2015:Large -0.3790*** -0.4503*** -0.7946*** -1.7849*** 
  (0.1449) (0.1463) (0.1934) (0.2139) 
2016:Large -0.6421*** -0.6898*** -1.0967*** -1.9308*** 
  (0.1468) (0.1482) (0.1963) (0.2175) 
2000:Large x MNE -1.7451*** -1.5094*** -1.6024*** -1.3151** 
  (0.4446) (0.4435) (0.4997) (0.5462) 
2001:Large x MNE -2.0168*** -1.7351*** -1.6660*** -1.0466** 
  (0.3979) (0.3978) (0.4783) (0.4984) 
2002:Large x MNE -2.1409*** -1.9829*** -1.1959*** -1.0171** 
  (0.3257) (0.3253) (0.3976) (0.4454) 
2003:Large x MNE -1.2244*** -1.0260*** -1.0556*** -1.2429*** 
  (0.2988) (0.2978) (0.3723) (0.4335) 
2004:Large x MNE -2.4361*** -2.2845*** -1.8052*** -1.6114*** 
  (0.2469) (0.2463) (0.3470) (0.3947) 
2005:Large x MNE -1.5695*** -1.3694*** -1.0705*** -0.9054** 
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  (0.2423) (0.2431) (0.3185) (0.3516) 
2006:Large x MNE -2.0878*** -1.8566*** -0.7579*** -0.7890** 
  (0.2100) (0.2101) (0.2895) (0.3176) 
2007:Large x MNE -0.9689*** -0.6266*** -0.3101 -0.0279 
  (0.2208) (0.2219) (0.2812) (0.2908) 
2008:Large x MNE -1.5318*** -1.2965*** -1.5250*** -0.8234*** 
  (0.2275) (0.2279) (0.2937) (0.2941) 
2009:Large x MNE -0.8038*** -0.5968*** -0.2437 -0.2402 
  (0.2269) (0.2268) (0.2890) (0.3038) 
2010:Large x MNE -0.8344*** -0.5917*** -0.7783*** -0.7657*** 
  (0.2069) (0.2069) (0.2680) (0.2868) 
2011:Large x MNE -1.1547*** -0.8956*** -1.0909*** -1.6932*** 
  (0.1966) (0.1964) (0.2576) (0.2806) 
2012:Large x MNE -1.1871*** -0.9812*** -1.3222*** -1.6207*** 
  (0.1950) (0.1949) (0.2575) (0.2894) 
2013:Large x MNE -0.5882*** -0.4110** -0.5016** -0.4745* 
  (0.1872) (0.1873) (0.2463) (0.2750) 
2014:Large x MNE -0.7135*** -0.5245*** -0.9343*** -0.6510** 
  (0.1825) (0.1826) (0.2418) (0.2673) 
2015:Large x MNE -0.3270* -0.2036 -0.5201** -0.0968 
  (0.1705) (0.1711) (0.2225) (0.2520) 
2016:Large x MNE -0.7032*** -0.5873*** -1.0718*** -0.6808*** 
  (0.1720) (0.1724) (0.2241) (0.2530) 
Profitability (EBIT/TOAS)   -23.4167*** -23.5781*** -26.1302*** 
    (0.0940) (0.1250) (0.1065) 
log Total Assets (TOAS)   -0.2317*** -0.0433*** -0.3191*** 
    (0.0088) (0.0102) (0.0098) 
Innovation (IFAS/TOAS)   -2.3973*** -2.3508*** -2.6047*** 
    (0.1010) (0.1048) (0.1057) 
Position in Group (GUO=1)   -0.7448*** -0.5962*** -0.8345*** 
    (0.0300) (0.0328) (0.0337) 
Country-Year Fixed Effects x x x x 
Industry Fixed Effects x x x x 
Country Restriction - - OECD EU 
R2 (within) 0.345 0.362 0.354 0.365 
Number of firms 1,001,429 1,001,429 843,911 854,141 
Observations 5,048,716 5,048,716 4,320,449 4,353,789 
Notes: This table presents the regression results for OECD BEPS Indicator 4. The dependent variable is the 
effective tax rate (ETR). Large is a dummy variable that is equal to one for all firms with more than 250 
employees. MNE is a dummy variable that is equal to one for all firms that belong to a group with a least one 
cross-border relationship. Profitability is the ratio of earnings before income and taxes (EBIT) to total assets 
(TOAS), innovation is the ratio of intangible fixed assets (IFAS) to total assets and position in group is a dummy 
variable that is equal to one for all headquarters. The dummy variables of interest are interacted with a year 
dummy to provide annual estimates. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1 and 99 percentile. We 
report standard errors clustered by firm in parentheses. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1 percent, 
5 percent, and 10 percent level, respectively.   
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Table 7: Indicator 4 - Robustness change of outcome variable 
Variable (1) 
2000:Large x MNE -0.0151 
  (0.0597) 
2001:Large x MNE -0.1056** 
  (0.0464) 
2002:Large x MNE -0.1709*** 
  (0.0361) 
2003:Large x MNE -0.0489 
  (0.0328) 
2004:Large x MNE -0.1017*** 
  (0.0275) 
2005:Large x MNE -0.0553* 
  (0.0297) 
2006:Large x MNE -0.1501*** 
  (0.0244) 
2007:Large x MNE -0.0983*** 
  (0.0258) 
2008:Large x MNE -0.1209*** 
  (0.0255) 
2009:Large x MNE -0.0399* 
  (0.0221) 
2010:Large x MNE -0.0697*** 
  (0.0200) 
2011:Large x MNE -0.1158*** 
  (0.0198) 
2012:Large x MNE -0.1221*** 
  (0.0188) 
2013:Large x MNE -0.0537*** 
  (0.0179) 
2014:Large x MNE -0.0632*** 
  (0.0178) 
2015:Large x MNE -0.0483*** 
  (0.0173) 
2016:Large x MNE -0.0883*** 
  (0.0177) 
Country-Year Fixed Effects x 
Industry Fixed Effects x 
Controls x 
R2 (within) 0.666 
Number of firms 1,001,429 
Observations 5,048,716 
Notes: This table presents the regression results for OECD BEPS Indicator 4. The dependent variable is the 
ratio of tax payments to total assets (TOAS). Large is a dummy variable that is equal to one for all firms with 
more than 250 employees. MNE is a dummy variable that is equal to one for all firms that belong to a group 
with a least one cross-border relationship. For the sake of brevity, we do not display the coefficient estimates 
for the control variables: Profitability is the ratio of earnings before income and taxes (EBIT) to total assets 
(TOAS), innovation is the ratio of intangible fixed assets (IFAS) to total assets and position in group is a 
dummy variable that is equal to one for all headquarters. The dummy variables of interest are interacted with 
a year dummy to provide annual estimates. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1 and 99 percentile. 
We report standard errors clustered by firm in parentheses. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1 
percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent level, respectively.   
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Table 8: Indicator 4 - Propensity score matching evaluation 
Matching Evaluation         
  Standardized Differences 
Bias reduction 
Variance Ratio 
  Raw Matched Raw Matched 
ln(TOAS) 1.2628 -0.0134 98.94% 1.3302 0.9296 
ln(PROD) 0.1151 -0.0351 69.51% 1.0248 0.9369 
D/E Ratio -0.2246 0.0267 88.14% 0.4634 0.9854 
Innovation -0.0967 -0.0091 90.57% 0.8897 0.9408 
Notes: This table presents the evaluation of the matching procedure on the logarithm of total assets (TOAS), 
the logarithm of productivity (PROD), which is the ratio of sales to total wages, the debt to equity ratio, and 
innovation, which is the ratio of intangible fixed assets (IFAS) to total assets (TOAS). The column Raw depicts 
the standardized differences and variance ratios in the unmatched sample. The column Matched depicts the 
standardized differences and variance ratios in the matched sample. The column Bias Reduction is the 
percentage reduction in the standardized differences between the unmatched and matched sample. The values 
depict the averages of all years. Standardized differences close to 0 and variance ratios close to 1 are indicators 




Table 9: Indicator 4 - Propensity score matching estimates on the ETR difference (ATE) 
Year ATE 
2000 -1.0154*** 
  (0.3164) 
2001 -0.7162** 
  (0.2794) 
2002 -0.2295 
  (0.2754) 
2003 -0.4179 
  (0.2605) 
2004 -0.5825** 
  (0.2290) 
2005 -0.7053*** 
  (0.2086) 
2006 -0.1611 
  (0.1900) 
2007 -0.5774*** 
  (0.1758) 
2008 -0.8239*** 
  (0.1835) 
2009 -0.1339 
  (0.1780) 
2010 -0.1824 
  (0.1688) 
2011 -0.4686*** 
  (0.1627) 
2012 -0.5112*** 
  (0.1591) 
2013 -0.5548*** 
  (0.1576) 
2014 -0.3559** 
  (0.1528) 
2015 -0.5237*** 
  (0.1555) 
2016 -0.9351*** 
  (0.1572) 
Observations 3,669,138 
Notes: The table depicts the annual average treatment effects (ATE) of being a multinational corporation on the 
ETR. The ATE estimates are based on a propensity score estimation procedure. The groups of multinational and 
domestic firms are matched on the logarithm of total assets (TOAS), the logarithm of productivity (PROD), 
which is the ratio of sales to total wages, the debt to equity ratio and innovation, which is the ratio of intangible 
fixed assets (IFAS) to total assets (TOAS). Standard errors are rely on the adjustment by Abadie and Imbens 
(2012) and take into account that the propensity scores to match the groups are estimated. ***, **, * denote 









Table 10: Indicator 5 – Country-Year distribution 















Notes: The table shows the number of countries with available data on receipts for the use of IP as balance of 
payments in current US dollar from the World Bank and available data on the gross domestic expenditure on 




Table 11: Indicator 5 - Countries in the high-ratio group 
  Base Year 2011 Base Year 2017 
1 Guatemala El Salvador 
2 Hungary Hungary 
3 Ireland Luxembourg 
4 Lesotho Madagascar 
5 Luxembourg Malta 
6 Madagascar Netherlands 
7 Malta Singapore 
8 Netherlands Switzerland 
9   United Kingdom 
Notes: The table shows the countries belonging to the high-ratio group. High-ratio countries are those 
countries that have a royalty receipts to R&D spending ratio of above 0.5 in a pre-defined base year. Column 







Table 12: Indicator 5 - Results 
Year 
OECD Base Year: 2011 Base Year: 2017 Base Year: Continuous 
Indicator High Low Indicator High Low Indicator High Low Indicator 
2005 2,8 131% 17% 7,7 64% 16% 4,0 148% 17% 8,7 
2006 2,5 130% 17% 7,6 61% 16% 3,8 157% 17% 9,2 
2007 2,6 140% 18% 7,7 62% 18% 3,5 168% 18% 9,1 
2008 2,5 150% 18% 8,4 66% 17% 3,9 126% 17% 7,2 
2009 2,7 153% 17% 9,1 74% 16% 4,6 178% 17% 10,6 
2010 4,3 156% 17% 9,1 72% 17% 4,3 152% 17% 8,9 
2011 5,8 153% 18% 8,7 70% 17% 4,0 153% 18% 8,7 
2012 5,8 169% 19% 9,0 75% 18% 4,3 127% 18% 7,2 
2013   168% 18% 9,5 78% 17% 4,5 146% 18% 8,3 
2014   201% 18% 10,9 86% 18% 4,8 127% 18% 7,1 
2015   235% 20% 11,9 92% 18% 5,1 126% 18% 7,0 
2016   186% 19% 9,9 84% 18% 4,6 168% 18% 9,2 
2017   194% 20% 9,8 98% 17% 5,7 98% 17% 5,7 
2018   195% 18% 10,7 86% 18% 4,7 195% 18% 10,7 
Notes: The table depicts the values of Indicator 5. Column 2 shows Indicator values estimated by the OECD (OECD, 2015). For each country the ratio of royalty receipts to 
R&D spending is calculated. Based on this ratio in a pre-defined base year, countries are assigned to high-ratio groups or low-ratio groups. The threshold values amounts to 
50%. Column 3 and 4 show the ratio of the countries in the high-ratio group and low-ratio group, respectively. Column 5 shows the estimated indicator value. Each panel 








Table 13: Indicator 5 - Results alternative data 
Year 
OECD Base Year: 2011 Base Year: 2017 Base Year: Continuous 
Indicator High Low Indicator High Low Indicator High Low Indicator 
2005 2,8 111% 13% 8,2 78% 14% 5,7 143% 14% 10,5 
2006 2,5 112% 14% 8,1 102% 14% 7,3 148% 14% 10,7 
2007 2,6 137% 16% 8,8 117% 16% 7,5 182% 16% 11,6 
2008 2,5 157% 16% 9,8 89% 16% 5,7 134% 16% 8,6 
2009 2,7 148% 14% 10,2 101% 15% 6,9 170% 15% 11,7 
2010 4,3 144% 15% 9,4 96% 15% 6,2 144% 15% 9,4 
2011 5,8 154% 17% 9,3 101% 17% 6,0 154% 17% 9,3 
2012 5,8 160% 17% 9,3 110% 16% 6,7 117% 16% 7,4 
2013   164% 16% 10,2 116% 16% 7,2 122% 16% 7,8 
2014   198% 17% 12,0 135% 17% 8,1 148% 16% 9,2 
2015   197% 17% 11,8 128% 16% 8,1 126% 15% 8,3 
2016   156% 16% 10,0 112% 16% 7,1 130% 15% 8,5 
2017   166% 17% 9,9 129% 15% 8,4 129% 15% 8,4 
2018   179% 16% 11,4 147% 16% 9,0 202% 16% 12,9 
Notes: The table depicts the values of Indicator 5. Column 2 shows Indicator values estimated by the OECD (OECD, 2015). For each country the ratio of royalty receipts to 
R&D spending is calculated. Based on this ratio in a pre-defined base year, countries are assigned to high-ratio groups or low-ratio groups. The threshold values amounts to 
50%. Column 3 and 4 show the ratio of the countries in the high-ratio group and low-ratio group, respectively. Column 5 shows the estimated indicator value. Each panel refers 
to a different base year for group assignment. The Worldbank and OECD are used as data source.    
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